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Abstract We conducted three studies to examine whether
the four great ape species (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas,
and orangutans) are able to use behavioral experimenter-
given cues in an object-choice task. In the subsequent
experimental conditions subjects were presented with two
eggs, one of which contained food and the other did not. In
Study 1 the experimenter examined both eggs by smelling
or shaking them, but only made a failed attempt to open
(via biting) the egg containing food. In a control condition,
the experimenter examined and attempted to open both
eggs, but in reverse order to control for stimulus enhance-
ment. The apes signiWcantly preferred the egg that was Wrst
examined and then bitten, but had no preference in a base-
line condition in which there were no cues. In Study 2, we
investigated whether the apes could extend this ability to
cues not observed in apes so far (i.e., attempting to pull
apart the egg), as well as whether they made this discrimi-
nation based on the function of the action the experimenter
performed. Subjects signiWcantly preferred eggs presented
with this novel cue, but did not prefer eggs presented with a
novel but functionally irrelevant action. In Study 3, apes
did not interpret human actions as cues to food-location
when they already knew that the eggs were empty. Thus,
great apes were able to use a variety of experimenter-given
cues associated with foraging actions to locate hidden food
and thereby were partially sensitive to the general purpose
underlying these actions.
Keywords Experimenter-given cues · Non-human 
primates · Object-choice
Introduction
In the last decade, much research has been done investi-
gating the types of cues various non-human species can
use to locate hidden rewards. In some cases, these cues
are due to the eVect that a reward has on the environment,
such as a noise that a container makes when shaken
because a reward is inside, or the orientation or shape of
the container due to the reward’s presence (e.g., Baillar-
geon 1995; Call in press). In other cases, these cues are
actions performed by experimenters with the intent to
inform the receiver about the presence of a reward inside
one of two identical containers. The most well-studied of
these communicative cues are pointing or head orienta-
tion, which are often accompanied by gaze alternation
between the subject and the target object to reinforce the
communicative nature of the action.
Human children appear to use communicative cues to
solve object-choice tasks from an early age (Behne et al.
2005). Even some domesticated species such as puppies,
without human contact, can spontaneously use communica-
tive cues like pointing (Hare et al. 2002). In contrast, non-
human primates rarely demonstrate such abilities. Multiple
species of monkeys seem unable to understand head- or
eye-orientation spontaneously, although they can learn to
use these kinds of cues correctly after training (Anderson
et al. 1995; Itakura and Anderson 1996; Vick and Anderson
2000; Anderson et al. 1996; but see also Vick and Ander-
son (2003) for positive results in a competitive task). Great
apes show more variable performance. Some studies indicate
that, despite their ability to follow a human’s gaze (Call
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118 Anim Cogn (2008) 11:117–128et al. 1998), chimpanzees still fail to use human pointing or
gazing cues in object-choice paradigms (Call and Toma-
sello 1994; Tomasello et al. 1997; Call et al. 1998, 2000;
Itakura et al. 1999). Other studies, however, indicate that
chimpanzees, orangutans, gorillas, and a white-handed gib-
bon are all successful at using at least some communicative
cues like pointing and head and eye orientation to locate
hidden food (Barth et al. 2005; Byrnit 2004; Inoue et al.
2004; Itakura and Tanaka 1998; Peignot and Anderson
1999; Povinelli et al. 1999; Miklósi and Soproni 2006).
However, it is notable that in most cases when subjects did
use these cues successfully, they have already had exten-
sive training wherefrom they might have learnt the cues.
Therefore there is currently no evidence that great apes can
spontaneously use communicative experimenter-given cues.
Several things, however, might account for apes’ failures
in these tasks. Most prominently, communicative experi-
menter-given cues such as pointing, tapping the container,
or gazing are common behaviors for humans, but may not
normally be used between conspeciWcs in other species. For
instance, chimpanzees do not manually point to indicate the
location of monopolizable food or the presence of predators
to other chimpanzees. Yet primates regularly observe their
conspeciWcs’ non-communicative behavior, which in some
cases may be used to infer potential food locations. Thus,
individuals may be able to use behavioral cues associated
with food acquisition and food processing. Unlike commu-
nicative cues, pure behavioral cues consist of fully func-
tional behaviors and do not reXect the actor’s intent to
communicate speciWc information to other individuals.
Considering an actor’s intent, in most situations observers
obtain information from behavioral cues that are not given
consciously by the actor, since his goal is to achieve some
beneWt for himself rather than providing others with infor-
mation that might lead to their beneWt (as it is the case with
most communicative cues). In addition, in some cases the
information that can be extracted from pure behavioral cues
(as foraging actions shown by a conspeciWc) can exceed the
amount of information extracted from communicative cues
(as gazing or pointing) by giving information on the nature
of the item (food or not) or how to obtain it. Because of this
fact and given that behavioral cues are both ubiquitous in
non-human life and may be more ecologically valid, apes
may Wnd it easier to use such cues compared to communi-
cative cues.
Indeed, there is some recent evidence supporting this
idea. Hare and Tomasello (2004) presented chimpanzees
with both communicative and behavioral cues in a coopera-
tive and a competitive situation, respectively. Chimpanzees
could successfully retrieve the cup with food when it was
indicated by a behavioral cue, namely a human or conspe-
ciWc reaching for the baited cup but not paying attention to
the subject. ConWrming previous researches, the subjects
failed to use a very similar communicative cue, i.e., a
human intentionally signaling the baited cup by pointing at
it. Although the models were performing very similar arm
movements, subjects diVerentiated these two cues. Bräuer
et al. (2006) presented chimpanzees and bonobos with
these same cues (as well as others), but subjects failed to
locate the hidden food using the two behavioral cues: one
cue in which the experimenter attempted to remove the lid
from the baited cup, and the reaching cue from Hare and
Tomasello (2004). One important diVerence between the
two studies may account for the subjects’ failures in the
reaching condition: in Hare and Tomasello’s study the
experimenter Wrst established a competitive relationship
with the subject before the cue was given; such a relation-
ship was not established in the Bräuer study. This competi-
tive context may have especially motivated the subjects.
Nonhuman primates routinely observe conspeciWcs eat-
ing, and may partially adopt the foraging techniques or eat
the same food as others (e.g., King 1994; Rijksen 1978;
Whitehead 1986). It is therefore possible that individuals
may be able to use behavioral cues involved in foraging to
decide which of two alternatives is more likely to yield
food. For example, some evidence suggests that rhesus
macaques Wnd behavioral cues useful in choosing between
edible and non-edible items. Santos et al. (2001) presented
monkeys with two novel objects, one of which the experi-
menter pretended to eat. Subjects preferred the “edible”
object over the one the experimenter had performed an
irrelevant action on.
Thus, great apes’ and monkeys’ mixed results on the use
of communicative experimenter-given cues may contrast
with their ability to spontaneously “eavesdrop” and extract
relevant information from behavioral cues that others pro-
vide (Santos et al. 2001; Hare and Tomasello 2004). The
aim of this study was to systematically examine the extent
to which great apes can use such behavioral cues. In partic-
ular, we investigated their ability to extract information
about food location based on the diVerential food-process-
ing behavior that an experimenter directed toward identical
pairs of objects (one of which was baited). After the experi-
menter had manipulated both objects, subjects were
allowed to select one. Except in control tests, the experi-
menter always directed behaviors toward the baited object
that were consistent with the attempt to extract its contents.
The types of actions used to indicate this intent varied in
their topography and sequence across conditions. We Wrst
presented subjects with behaviors that they had previously
used during foraging, and later we examined how Xexibly
they could use behavioral cues by presenting them with
uncommon foraging behaviors. Before presenting the sub-
jects with the actual test, we exposed them to the plastic
eggs later used in the studies for observing the apes’ typical
foraging behavior when they encountered those objects.123
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uncommon to the subjects in this foraging situation.
Study 1: cues belonging to the subjects’ typical 
repertoire
This study tested whether witnessing an experimenter try-
ing (but failing) to open a plastic egg led great apes to
select it over an alternative. We presented the apes diVer-
ent sets of behavioral cues across three conditions. The
Familiar behavior condition included very familiar behav-
iors both for checking and trying to open the egg. In the
Novel checking behavior condition we used an uncommon
checking action and a familiar opening attempt action. In
the Reversed sequence condition we applied the same
checking and opening attempt action on each egg but we
varied their sequences. For one egg the experimenter Wrst
checked and then made an attempt as if to open it, and for
the other the experimenter Wrst attempted to open it and
then checked it.
Methods
Subjects and housing
Twelve chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), four bonobos (Pan
paniscus), six gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), and seven
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus abelii) participated in this
study. The bonobos ranged in age from 7 to 21 years, the
gorillas from 6 to 26 years, the orangutans from 6 to
33 years, and the chimpanzees from 4 to 28 years. The sub-
jects were socially housed in groups of at least Wve individ-
uals (separated by species) at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate
Research Center (WKPRC) in the Leipzig Zoo, Germany.
Each species had access to an indoor area (230–430 m2)
and an outdoor area (1,680–4,000 m2) furnished with vari-
ous climbing structures, shelter, and natural vegetation. At
night, the apes slept in several series of cages (40–50 m2).
In addition to experiments, the animals were provided with
a special enrichment program, including diVerent kinds of
tools and foraging containers. Several times per day, the
apes were fed a diet consisting primarily of vegetables,
fruits, and cereals with regular additions of eggs and meat
for the chimpanzees.
All individuals living at the WKPRC were tested in all
three studies, except for three female chimpanzees (aged
25, 28, and 29 years) that were not comfortable touching
the plastic materials used in the experiments. The male
gorilla “Gorgo” only participated in the Wrst experimental
and the Baseline condition because of motivational reasons.
All subjects had participated in numerous cognitive testing
(including object choice paradigms, e.g., Bräuer et al. 2006;
Call 2006; Hare et al. 2002; Hare and Tomasello 2004).
According to keepers’ knowledge and the study archive of
the WKPRC, our studies were the Wrst to use plastic eggs.
Test sessions took place in one of two familiar test cages
that were »15 m2. The subjects were used to being sepa-
rated from their group members and kept in adjacent enclo-
sures for testing. They were not food-deprived for testing,
and water was available throughout all testing times. They
were not distressed and were free to stop participating at
any time.
Materials and setup
In all experiments the experimenter sat behind a wooden
table that was 100 cm wide, 40 cm long, and 50 cm tall.
This table was Wxed at the animal’s cage in front of a
plexiglass panel. Subjects sat behind this panel during the
test; three holes (left, middle, and right; ; 5 cm) in the
panel allowed subjects to reach through the panel and indi-
cate their choices.
A movable platform was attached onto the top of the
table. Two small, round plastic containers (2 cm high) were
aYxed to the left and the right corners of the platform,
opposite the experimenter. In each trial, choice objects
(plastic eggs) were placed in these containers.
In the present study, we used an object-choice-design in
which the subjects chose between two blue plastic eggs
(6 £ 4 cm) that had been Wlled by the experimenter before
each test session. In every trial, one of the eggs was Wlled
with wood wool and a grape (baited egg), while the other
contained wood wool only (distractor egg). There was no
visual diVerence between the two eggs, but the experi-
menter always knew the contents of each egg.
To make sure that the subject could only choose one side
in every trial, a piece of plexiglass (Sliding Plexi,
80 £ 10 cm) was attached to the platform on the subject’s
side of the table; the Plexiglas was mounted on rails so that
it could be moved to the left or right by the subject to indi-
cate its choice. Once the Plexiglas was moved to allow
access to one side of the table, it blocked the access to the
other. This way the subjects’ choice was explicit. All tests
were videotaped.
Procedure
Pretest
Although all 29 subjects had previously experienced stud-
ies with object-choice-designs, none of them had been
deliberately exposed to plastic eggs before this study.
Therefore, each subject completed a two-part pretest before
the experiment began. First, seven plastic eggs, each123
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presented one after the other with an 1 min delay in
between. Three of the chimpanzees were unwilling to touch
the eggs, and consequently were dropped from this study.
All other apes did not hesitate to take the eggs and open
them in one of the three following ways: in 5.9% of the tri-
als subjects stepped on the egg to break it; in 6.4% of the
trials they pushed it open by scrunching both hands
together and in most of the trials (87.7%) the subjects bit
the egg open.
The second pretest was designed to show the subjects
that the egg containers did not always contain food. Every
subject was given eight eggs in the way described above,
but half of them were Wlled with a grape and wood wool (to
avoid auditory cues), and the other half with wood wool
only. The apes opened the eggs in a manner similar to Wrst
pretest, biting open most of the eggs (93.1%). As such, it
seems that biting is the most typical way for the tested apes
to open a small plastic ovaliform container.
Test
At the beginning of each trial, the experimenter occluded
the plexiglass window with a solid opaque occluder
(100 £ 50 cm) to ensure that the subject could not watch
him while he placed an egg in each of the two plastic con-
tainers. To prevent auditory cues, he always baited the left
container Wrst, the right one second. After aligning the Slid-
ing Plexi in the center of the table, the occluder was
removed. The subject now had an unrestricted view of the
person and the platform. To draw the ape’s attention to the
testing setup, the experimenter called the subject by her
name and waited until she took a seat in front of the plexi-
glass window. Once the subject was looking at the experi-
menter, the experimenter began a speciWed foraging
behavior (see conditions below). According to a randomly
determined order he took one egg and performed speciWc
behavioral cues that varied depending on whether the egg
contained food, or was just a distractor. The side on which
the egg with food was placed and the egg on which the
demonstrator Wrst performed the cues were both counter-
balanced. During the cue period, the experimenter attended
only to the action he was performing, looking either at the
egg or at the platform. All his demonstrations were done
with his right hand. Once the behavioral cue was com-
pleted, the experimenter then placed the egg back in its
respective gourd, and began another set of cues with the
remaining egg. The experimenter focused on each egg for
the same amount of time.
After the second object had been placed back in the
gourd, the platform was moved closer to the plexiglass win-
dow so that the subject could make her choice. Until she
had moved the Sliding Plexi, the experimenter looked at the
middle of the platform. The chosen egg was given to the
subject through the middle hole in the panel. Once the cho-
sen egg was in the ape’s enclosure the trial was Wnished.
In every condition each subject was given either one
(Baseline) or two sessions (experimental conditions) on
diVerent days. Each session consisted of six trials. We
administered the four conditions in the following order.
Familiar behavior (smell vs. smell and bite)
Baited egg The demonstrator took the egg, moved it near
his nose and smelled it (three sniVs, duration: 3 s). He then
bit onto the egg with his teeth visible (three times, duration:
3 s). This biting action was combined with clear signs of
physical eVort: a facial expression (constricted eyes caused
by exertion of cheek muscles and muscular pulled down
eyebrows) and for chimps and bonobos typical auditory
signals (short and low pitch palatal sounds). This failed
attempt was repeated once. After that he placed this egg
back in the round container.
Distractor egg The demonstrator took the egg Wlled with
wood wool only, moved it near his nose and smelled it
(three sniVs, duration: 3 s). This smelling action was
repeated twice.
Baseline (control)
This condition tested whether subjects were able to use
visual cues or scents to detect the hidden food. Following
the completion of the second session of the previous condi-
tion, subjects had a 2-min break. Then the experimenter
placed the baited and the distractor eggs in the plastic con-
tainers as in the previous condition, but gave no behavioral
cues. That is, directly following the placement of the eggs,
the platform was moved toward the ape so that it could
make its choice.
Novel checking behavior (shake vs. shake and bite)
This condition examined how a more novel checking
behavior (shaking the egg near one’s ear) that diVers from
the standard behavior displayed by great apes (smelling the
egg) inXuences their selection between two objects.
Baited egg The demonstrator took the egg, moved it to
his right ear, and shook it focusing all his attention on the
object (three shakings, duration: 3 s). He then bit into the
egg in the same way as described in the Familiar behavior
condition. The only diVerence in this condition was that
there were no auditory signals given by the demonstrator.
He also repeated this failed attempt once before he placed
this egg back in the gourd.123
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right side of his head and shook it (three shakings, duration:
3 s). He repeated this exploratory behavior twice and then
put the egg back.
Reversed sequence (bite and smell vs. smell and bite)
This condition investigated whether apes simply chose the
egg that was bitten and was therefore enhanced by that
additional action. Here both eggs were bitten and smelled
although each egg received a diVerent order of actions.
Additionally, this condition examined whether the order of
the actions had an eVect on the apes’ choices.
Baited egg The demonstrator’s actions were the same as
those shown in the Familiar behavior condition (baited egg).
Distractor egg The demonstrator performed the same
actions as with the baited egg, but in reverse order: he took
the egg, moved it to his mouth and bit onto it (see also
Baited egg) (three times, duration: 3 s). He repeated this
failed attempt once, and then moved the object to his nose,
smelled it (three sniVs, duration: 3 s), and then placed this
egg back in the container.
Data analysis
We videotaped all trials and scored the object selected by
the subjects. We did not assess inter-observer reliability
because the subjects’ choices could be determined with-
out ambiguity. First, we compared species’ performance
using ANOVAs. We used the one-sample t-test to deter-
mine whether subjects selected the baited egg above
chance levels. In cases where variables violated the crite-
ria of normality (using Kolmogorov—Smirnov test), we
used Wilcoxon tests to test the observed values against
those expected by chance (p = 0.50). Likewise, binomial
tests were used to test whether individual subjects
performed above chance levels individually (p = 0.50).
These same tests were used to compare the number of
subjects that chose correctly in more than half of the trials
to the ones that chose correctly in less than half of the
trials. The eVect of age was assessed with the Pearson
correlations.
Results
Figure 1 presents the percentage of correct trials for all con-
ditions. Subjects as a group selected the baited eggs above
chance in all experimental conditions [Familiar: (56.6% of
trials), t28 = 3.11, p = 0.004; Novel checking: (55.9% of tri-
als), t27 = 3.60, p = 0.001; Reversed sequence: (56.3% of
trials), t27 = 2.52, p = 0.018]. In contrast, they failed to do
so in the Baseline condition (46.5% of trials), T+ = 56.0,
N = 12 (17 ties), p = 0.20. There was no evidence of
improvement across the two sessions for any of the experi-
mental conditions [Wilcoxon tests: Familiar: T+ = 93.0,
N = 18 (11 ties), p = 0.769; Novel checking: T+ = 59.5,
N = 14 (15 ties), p = 0.607; Reversed sequence: T+ = 71.0,
N = 13 (16 ties), p = 0.081].
There were signiWcantly more subjects choosing the cor-
rect egg for more than half of the trials (seven or more trials
correct) compared to the number of subjects that were cor-
rect in less than half of the trials (Wve or less trials correct)
in all experimental conditions (Binomial test: Familiar: 15
vs. 4, p = 0.019; Novel checking: 15 vs. 3, p = 0.008;
Reverse sequence: 14 vs. 4, p = 0.031). Analysis at the indi-
vidual level revealed that one (female chimpanzee) and
three subjects (one male orangutan, one female gorilla, and
Fig. 1 Mean percentage of tri-
als in which the subjects chose 
the “egg with food” in each of 
the conditions tested in Study 1. 
Numbers within the bars repre-
sent the numbers of subjects that 
chose the correct egg more than 
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trials : less than half of the trials. 
See text for statistical details 
(*result signiWcant at 5% level; 
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mial test: p = 0.039) in the Familiar and Reverse sequence
conditions, respectively.
There were no signiWcant species diVerences in any of
the conditions (Familiar behavior: F3,28 = 0.12, p = 0.95;
Novel checking behavior: F3,27 = 0.96, p = 0.43; Reverse
sequence: F3,27 = 0.85, p = 0.48; Baseline: Kruskal–Wallis
H3,29 = 0.475, p = 0.933). No age eVects could be found for
any of the conditions (Familiar behavior: r29 = 0.003,
p = 0.99; Novel checking behavior: r28 = 0.036, p = 0.86;
Reverse sequence: r28 = 0.040, p = 0.84; Baseline:
r29 = 0.008, p = 0.97).
Discussion
Apes preferred eggs that the experimenter had attempted to
open. Thus, when the apes observed an experimenter smell-
ing one of the eggs and subsequently attempting to bite it
open, they chose this egg over another one that the experi-
menter had only smelled. Moreover, they also selected eggs
that the experimenter had smelled Wrst and then bitten over
those that were bitten Wrst and then smelled. Finally, apes
also continued to show a preference for the baited eggs
even when the experimenter used actions that were not used
by these apes but that were still consistent with extractive
behavior. Finally, when no cues were given in the Baseline
condition, subjects did not show any preference, thus ruling
out the use of uncontrolled cues provided by the experi-
menter or the test materials (e.g., smell cues). Note also that
there was no evidence of improvement throughout testing.
There are several possible explanations for the apes’ suc-
cess in the Familiar behavior condition. One possibility is
that the subjects could have simply chosen the correct egg
in the Familiar and Novel checking behavior conditions
because the baited egg received two diVerent types of
actions (as opposed to just one performed on the alternative
egg). However, the Reverse sequence condition ruled out
this possibility because there was the same number of
actions directed toward each egg, albeit in reverse order.
We can also rule out the possibility that the subjects were
responding to the presence of speciWc actions such as smell
or bite. The Novel checking behavior condition did not
include smelling and the subjects still continued to prefer
the baited egg consistently. Moreover, the Reverse
sequence condition included both smell and bite in both
alternatives and subjects still chose correctly. Incidentally,
success in this condition demonstrated that subjects were
sensitive to the order in which the actions were performed,
not just their presence or absence.
The source of the observed preferences remains unclear.
One possibility is that subjects may have extrapolated from
their own experience in the pretest when all subjects had
opened plastic eggs. It is also possible that they may have
performed (or witnessed other individuals perform) behav-
iors similar to the ones presented here. Consequently, expe-
rience from everyday life could explain these results.
Although this explanation may not apply to the Novel
checking behavior condition (recall that we did not observe
animals shaking the eggs during pretests), we wanted to see
if the subjects could consistently perform successfully with
novel behavioral cues, which they did not perform during
the pretest. SpeciWcally, we tested whether subjects could
also understand a diVerent attempt to open the egg besides
biting.
Study 2: uncommon behavioral cues
In Study 1, we showed that great apes used behavioral cues
(including their sequence) that were familiar to them
(behaviors typically displayed when exposed to plastic
eggs). Here, we examined how Xexible this ability was by
presenting subjects with two conditions in which new
actions were performed on the egg containing food. Apes
witnessed the experimenter trying to open the egg with her
Wngers, but failing (Failed Attempt condition, MeltzoV
1995). We compared this condition to an Irrelevant action
condition in which the experimenter applied a non-foraging
action to the egg.
Methods
Subjects
All subjects included in Study 1 participated in this study.
Materials
We used the same materials as in Study 1.
Procedure
We used the same procedure as in Study 1. All subjects
experienced the following two conditions in a counterbal-
anced order across subjects.
Uncommon relevant behavior (smell vs. smell and pull 
apart)
Baited egg After the demonstrator had taken the egg, he
moved it to his nose and smelled it (three sniVs, duration:
3 s). He then moved the egg in front of his body and grasped
it with both hands on opposite sides. He “tried” to pull both
parts of the egg apart but failed because his Wngers on his123
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the object while acting with it, performed this action for 7 s
while making the same eVortful facial expressions described
in the Familiar Behavior condition from Study 1. After-
wards, he placed the egg back in the container.
Distractor egg The demonstrator took the egg, moved to
his nose and smelled it (three sniVs, duration: 3 s). He
repeated this exploratory behavior twice before he placed
the egg back in the container.
Irrelevant behavior (smell vs. smell and egg on the head)
Baited egg The demonstrator examined the egg as in the
New Behavior condition (sniVing for 3 s). Next, he took the
object to his head and twice moved the egg around the
crown of his scalp in a circular fashion for a total duration
of 7 s. While the person was performing this action, his
head was positioned as it was in the previous condition; the
only diVerence was that in this condition he looked straight
at the table. Once this action was completed, he placed the
egg back in the container.
Distractor egg The demonstrator used the same actions as
in the New Behavior (distractor egg) condition.
Data analysis
We coded and analyzed the data in the same way as in Study 1.
Results
Figure 2 presents the percentage of correct trials for each
condition. Subjects selected the baited eggs above chance
in the Uncommon relevant behavior condition (57.4% of
trials), t27 = 4.29, p < 0.001. In contrast, the apes signiW-
cantly preferred the unbaited egg in the Irrelevant behavior
condition by choosing the baited egg in 44.7% of trials,
T+ = 108.0, N = 15 (13 ties), p = 0.004. The subjects’ per-
formance in both conditions diVered signiWcantly, Wilco-
xon, T+ = 225.5, N = 21 (seven ties), p < 0.001. There was
no evidence of improvement across the two sessions for the
Uncommon, Wilcoxon, T+ = 110.0, N = 18 (ten ties),
p = 0.296, or the Irrelevant behavior condition, Wilcoxon,
T+ = 79.0, N = 16 (12 ties), p = 0.605.
There were signiWcantly more subjects choosing the cor-
rect egg in more than half of the trials compared to the
number of subjects that were correct in less than half of the
trials in the Uncommon behavior condition (Binominal test,
16 vs. 1, p < 0.001). The reverse was true for the Irrelevant
behavior condition in which most subjects selected the
baited egg in less than six trials (Binominal test, 3 vs. 12,
p = 0.035). Individual analyses revealed that one female
chimpanzee performed above chance in the Uncommon
behavior condition (Binomial test: p = 0.039).
There were no signiWcant species diVerences in the
Uncommon behavior, F3,27 = 0.76, p = 0.53, or the Irrele-
vant behavior conditions, Kruskal–Wallis H3,28 = 1.074,
p = 0.80. No eVect of age could be found in any of the con-
ditions (Uncommon behavior: r28 = ¡0.077, p = 0.70, Irrel-
evant behavior: r28 = 0.349, p = 0.07).
Discussion
Apes successfully selected the baited egg after witnessing
the experimenter trying to open it with a set of actions that
they themselves had not used or seen the experimenter use
prior to the test, but failed to do so when the experimenter
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124 Anim Cogn (2008) 11:117–128used an irrelevant action on the egg. In fact, they avoided
the egg upon which the experimenter had applied an irrele-
vant action. This means that apes paid close attention to the
experimenter’s speciWc actions (ruling out stimulus
enhancement in the process) and that they use them to
assess which egg was baited with food.
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 provide a very consis-
tent picture. Most apes preferred one of the eggs above
chance levels, and their preferences appear to have been
driven by the experimenters’ actions. SpeciWcally, when the
actions were consistent with foraging behavior, the apes
preferred those eggs. However, one problem with these
results is that the subjects’ preference for the baited egg did
not exceed 60% in any of the conditions. In the next study
we examined the previous results more in depth, speciW-
cally to determine why the apes’ performance, though sig-
niWcant, was not at higher levels.
Study 3: additional controls
The following two experiments were designed to check
whether the subjects’ overall performance might increase if
the demonstrator did not check the empty egg and then per-
form an irrelevant action on it. In addition, in the Empty
Eggs condition we wanted to investigate whether the apes
really understood that the experimenter’s actions were
directed to the content of the eggs, not the eggs themselves.
Methods
Subjects
All subjects from Study 2 participated in the current study
except for a male orangutan (“Walter”), a male gorilla
(“N’Kwango”), and a female gorilla (“Viringika”) because
they were not available when testing took place.
Materials
We used the same materials as in Study 1.
Procedure
We used the same procedure as in Study 1 including coun-
terbalancing between and within trials. All subjects experi-
enced the two conditions in the following order.
Empty eggs
This condition tested whether the apes simply reacted to the
exploratory action combined with the attempt to open the
object, or if they actually understood that there was food
inside this particular egg and that the demonstrator had the
goal of obtaining this food. This condition was identical to
the Familiar behavior condition from Experiment 1 except
that the experimenter showed the apes that both eggs were
empty before he gave his behavioral cues. To do so he took
one egg, opened it with his hands (by pushing it with his
thumbs) and showed it to the subject for 2 s. After that he
showed the subject the second egg in the same way. After
the demonstration was over, the subject could select one of
the eggs. If she chose the egg that the experimenter had bit-
ten, the subject was given the chosen egg and rewarded
with a grape (within the next second). If the subject chose
the other egg, she was simply handed the chosen egg.
Distractor action
This condition addressed issues concerning the frequency
with which the subjects chose the Baited egg. Although
they preferred the egg that the demonstrator had attempted
to open signiWcantly more than the alternative without food,
they still chose the distractor in about 40% of the trials. Did
they do so because the treatment of the alternative was
ambiguous, implying that it could possibly contain food? In
this condition we wanted to decrease the food-relevant
information the demonstrator gave about the distractor egg.
The experimenter smelled and bit the Baited egg as in the
Familiar behavior condition of Experiment 1, but per-
formed a new, neutral action on the Distractor egg: he took
the egg, moved it to the middle of his chest and, while look-
ing at the platform, twisted it for 9 s. Afterwards he placed
it back on the platform.
Data analysis
We coded and analyzed the data in the same way as in
Study 1.
Results
Figure 3 presents the percentage of correct trials for each
condition. Subjects selected the baited egg above chance in
the Distractor condition (57.3% of trials), t24 = 4.18,
p < 0.001, but not in the Empty eggs condition (49.7% of
trials), T+ = 30.0, N = 10 (16 ties), p = 1.00. There was no
evidence of improvement across the two sessions for the
Distractor, Wilcoxon, T+ = 52.0, N = 13 (13 ties), p =
0.709, or the Empty eggs condition, Wilcoxon, T+ = 66.0,
N = 14 (12 ties), p = 0.438.
There were signiWcantly more subjects choosing the cor-
rect egg in more than half of the trials compared to the
number of subjects that were correct in less than half of the123
Anim Cogn (2008) 11:117–128 125trials in the Distractor condition (Binominal test, 14 vs. 1,
p = 0.001) but not in the Empty eggs condition (Binomial
test: 4 vs. 6, p = 0.75). There were no signiWcant species
diVerences in the Empty eggs condition, Kruskal–Wallis
H3,26 = 0.480, p = 0.917. In contrast, there were signiWcant
diVerences between species in the neutral (Distractor)
behavior condition, F3,25 = 3.17, p = 0.045. Post hoc analy-
ses (Tukey HSD) indicated that bonobos outperformed
orangutans (p = 0.039). No eVect could be found for the
subjects’ age on the results for any condition (Empty eggs:
r26 = 0.043, p = 0.83; Distractor action: r26 = ¡0.178,
p = 0.40).
Discussion
When the apes were shown that both options were empty
before the experimenter performed any cues, they choose
randomly between the two eggs (despite being rewarded for
selecting the egg associated with foraging actions). In con-
trast, they continued to use those cues when one of the eggs
was baited and the experimenter performed non-foraging
actions on the empty egg. This implies that in previous
studies the subjects did in fact infer from the experi-
menter’s behavior whether there was food inside the eggs,
rather than simply preferring one of the cues. As in previ-
ous experiments, there was no evidence that subjects
learned to respond to the correct alternative during the
course of the experiment.
Contrary to our expectations, in this study subjects did
not increase their preference for the baited egg compared to
previous conditions in Studies 1 and 2, even though only
the baited egg received actions such as smelling and biting
that are consistent with foraging. A possible explanation for
this result is that the apes thought the novel cue was not
irrelevant. Such an explanation, though speculative, could
also account for the species diVerences we found in this
condition. For example, orangutans may Wnd this particular
action as being more indicative of the presence of food than
bonobos do, which could be supported by the fact that we
have observed orangutans play with food in many situa-
tions.
General discussion
Great apes were able to use systematically varied behav-
ioral experimenter-given cues associated with foraging
actions to locate hidden food. Study 1 established that sub-
jects’ success was independent from the kind of inspection
behavior shown by the human experimenter (smelling and
shaking). Furthermore, that study also indicated that sub-
jects were sensitive to the speciWc sequence of Wrst inspect-
ing the egg’s contents, and then trying to open it: when
given a choice between this sequence and a reversed
sequence, they preferred the egg that the experimenter Wrst
inspected and then tried to bite open. Study 2 extended this
ability to opening actions that subjects had not performed
themselves in the pretest or any of the later experiments
(representing a total of 3,052 trials), thus ruling out the pos-
sibility that observing a biting action was necessary to suc-
ceed. Indeed, if the experimenter tried to pull the egg apart
with both hands (e.g., MeltzoV 1995), apes could also use
this cue to infer the food location. Study 3 showed that sub-
jects only used the information provided by the actions
when there was a possibility that one of the eggs contained
food; when both eggs were known to be empty, they
ignored the cues. Thus, actions were meaningful insofar
they informed subjects about the location of food. Two
conditions, one in Study 1 (Baseline) and one in Study 2
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cuing either by the experimenter or the test materials (e.g.,
food smell) because subjects failed to select the baited egg
above chance. Likewise, we found no evidence that sub-
jects learned to use those cues during the course of any of
the experiments. Thus, subjects were able to use a variety
of experimenter-given cues associated with foraging to
select one of two alternatives.
Subjects may have solved the task by mapping their own
experience to the information they observed and then judg-
ing what alternative was more likely to contain food. Note,
however, that this assessment was not based on the pres-
ence or absence of a particular cue. Subjects solved the task
after using various actions both for inspection (e.g., smell-
ing or shaking) or access to the egg’s contents (i.e., biting
or pulling apart). More importantly, they also succeeded
when the same actions were performed on both eggs, albeit
in diVerent orders, as well as when they never had per-
formed the behaviors themselves during any of the experi-
ments. Finally, the very same actions that had been
eVectively used in some conditions were ignored when sub-
jects knew that the eggs were empty.
In addition to mapping the observed actions with their
own experience, subjects may have learned to identify
those actions displayed by other individuals that were con-
sistently associated with positive outcomes. Again, one
problem with this possibility as a primary explanation for
our results is that the apes still selected the baited egg over
the alternative when presented with novel or uncommon
foraging actions that appear to be absent from the apes’
behavioral repertoire when exposed to plastic eggs.
Another possibility is that the apes simply preferred nov-
elty. However, this does not explain why both apes and rhe-
sus monkeys (Santos et al. 2001) do not prefer novel
actions in a distractor condition (see Study 3). Therefore,
subjects must have made some sort of inference regarding
the food location when presented with novel or uncommon
foraging actions.
The extent to which the apes made such inferences in the
current task is therefore an important and outstanding ques-
tion. Did subjects make their choices based on purely
observable behavioral indicators only, no matter how com-
plex? Or did they go beyond such observable information
and interpreted the meaning of the cues? For instance, sub-
jects may have inferred the content of the baited egg from
the demonstrator’s actions (‘there is food inside that egg’),
or they even may have understood that the experimenter
was attempting to open the object to get the food inside it
(“the experimenter is trying to open that egg because there
is food inside that egg”). This mentalistic account, although
more interpretive, is supported by the Wndings of Call et al.
(2004) in which chimpanzees attended to a human experi-
menter’s goals. That is, chimpanzees waited more patiently
in front of a human experimenter when he was unable to
give them food compared to when he was behaving in a
very similar way but was unwilling to give the chimpanzee
the food. Second, some of the actions presented to subjects
in the current study were novel or uncommon actions, so it
is unlikely that the apes had a simple behavioral under-
standing of the cues. Nevertheless, current research has not
determined exactly what great apes understand about the
goals of agents.
Our studies also hint that apes perceive sequential
series of actions and attribute greater importance to spe-
ciWc sequences. In Study 1, subjects preferred the
“inspect then try to open” sequence compared to the “try
to open then inspect” sequence. To human subjects, the
Wrst sequence indicates the presence of food whereas the
second one indicates its absence because this sequence
can be interpreted as a rejection. Apes also made this dis-
tinction. However, it is currently unclear whether they
did so based on their past experience with such sequences
(A + B = baited; B + A = empty) without analyzing the
causal structure of such sequences, or if they actually
made their decision based on such causal information.
Some data does suggest that chimpanzees may engage in
certain kinds of causal reasoning (e.g., Premack and Pre-
mack 1983; Call 2004, 2006), which lends support to the
second interpretation. Additionally, subjects did not use
similar causal information when it was given about
empty eggs, suggesting that they linked the experi-
menter’s behavior with the food located inside one of the
eggs.
These Wndings highlight an important psychological
distinction between attributing meaning to actions, and
attributing meaning to communicative actions (e.g., Toma-
sello 1999), and a closer inspection of the Empty eggs con-
dition is very revealing. In that condition, subjects were
shown that both eggs were empty and then the experi-
menter smelled and bit one egg and only smelled the other
egg. If subjects selected the egg bitten by the experi-
menter, they were rewarded. Subjects failed to select the
correct alternative above chance, despite the fact that those
same subjects had consistently used identical cues to iden-
tify the baited egg in other conditions. Thus, when the
behavior became an irrelevant cue, subjects completely
disregarded it. However, had they understood the cue to be
communicative (“Look, choose this egg and you’ll get
food!”), as humans might have, they would have been suc-
cessful. This converges with other data showing that chim-
panzees are more proWcient at using pure behavioral cues
indicating an intentional act than using communicative
cues. In particular, chimpanzees located hidden food if
they saw an experimenter reaching for a container in a
competitive setting, but did not when the experimenter
communicated the location of the food by pointing to the123
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asello 2004). It is therefore possible that the subjects in the
current task also viewed the experimenter as a competitor
who was trying to extract the (subjects’) food from one of
the two eggs (which then would have resulted in the sub-
jects receiving nothing).
One caveat of our results is that although the great
majority of subjects preferred the egg on which the human
performed foraging behaviors (but did not show this prefer-
ence in control conditions without such behavioral cues)
their overall levels of preference were relatively low. We
tried to boost the subjects’ performance by contrasting
actions with and without foraging components. Although
the data again revealed consistent diVerences in the apes’
preference between the two options, general levels of pref-
erence remained the same. This makes us cautious regard-
ing the robustness of apes’ knowledge and their explicit
understanding about the foraging actions as indicators for
the location of food. In particular, certain procedural
aspects of the experiment may have aVected subjects’ per-
formance. For instance, we may speculate that subjects may
have assumed that both eggs were baited (despite never
experiencing that situation during the test), or the apes may
have had position biases or made alternating choice that
contributed to a noisier data set. Indeed, the subjects’ low
performance may have been inXuenced by the fact that the
experimenter placed the objects on the table and then pro-
ceeded to inspect and attempt to open them. That is, if a
second experimenter brought in the eggs and placed them
on the table for the Wrst experimenter to inspect, this may
have increased the subject’s performance.
In conclusion, great apes were able to use a variety of
experimenter-given cues associated with foraging actions
to locate hidden food. Since apes successfully understood
a variety of cues, including some that they do not use, this
suggests that the subjects were partially sensitive to the
general purpose underlying these actions. Future research
needs to determine what exactly the great apes understand
about behavioral experimenter-given cues, speciWcally
what type of inferences they use and to what extent their
use of these cues reXects an understanding of others’
goals.
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